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Abstract
Nanotechnology research has lately been of intense interest because of its perceived potential for
many diverse fields of science. Nanotechnology's tools have found application in diverse fields, from
biology to device physics. By the 1990s, there was a concerted effort in the United States to
develop a national initiative to promote such research. The success of this effort led to a significant
influx of resources and interest in nanotechnology and nanobiotechnology and to the establishment
of centralized research programs and facilities. Further government initiatives (at federal, state, and
local levels) have firmly cemented these disciplines as 'big science,' with efforts increasingly
concentrated at select laboratories and centers. In many respects, these trends mirror certain
changes in academic science over the past twenty years, with a greater emphasis on applied science
and research that can be more directly utilized for commercial applications.
We also compare the National Nanotechnology Initiative and its successors to the Human
Genome Project, another large-scale, government funded initiative. These precedents made
acceptance of shifts in nanotechnology easier for researchers to accept, as they followed trends
already established within most fields of science. Finally, these trends are examined in the design of
technologies for detection and treatment of cancer, through the Alliance for Nanotechnology in
Cancer initiative of the National Cancer Institute. Federal funding of these nanotechnology
initiatives has allowed for expansion into diverse fields and the impetus for expanding the scope of
research of several fields, especially biomedicine, though the ultimate utility and impact of all these
efforts remains to be seen.
Background
On September 13, 2004, at a conference room at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, the
National Cancer Institute (NCI) formally launched the
Alliance for Nanotechnology in Cancer to an audience of
reporters, government officials, and scientists. The pro-
gram commenced with general speeches detailing the ini-
tiative, exploring safety and ethical issues, and explaining
the potential of nanotechnology for cancer applications
for the benefit of the non-technical members of the audi-
ence. Later, a scientific round-table followed, featuring
prominent cancer and nanotechnology researchers
including Richard Smalley (inventor of C60 and winner of
the Nobel Prize), Mauro Ferrari of Ohio State University,
and Andrew von Eschenbach, director of the NCI. During
the roundtable, the speakers discussed various options for
researchers to join the efforts of the Alliance [Note A]. This
program, initially scheduled to last for five years with
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cations of nanotechnology for cancer diagnosis and treat-
ment, yet it only represented a fraction of total spending
on nanobiotechnology applications. The subsequent
grant applications to these NCI programs signaled the
increasing interest of the biological and physical science
communities in utilizing nanotechnology to address
issues of cancer biology, a sizable expansion of the bur-
geoning nanobiotechnology movement thanks to federal
patronage.
To trace the genesis of this alliance, including the science
and politics fundamentally underlying the program, it is
necessary to briefly visit the increase in multidisciplinary
research between biology and other fields from the 1970s
onwards [Note B]. The idea of directed manipulations at
the nanoscale finally became reality by the last decades of
the twentieth century. Research in biology demonstrated
that the fundamental reactions of life also occur at the
nanoscale. Though scientists did manage to combine
these two seemingly disparate fields, this combination
was by no means inevitable.
Though there had been increased linkage between
academia and industry for physics and materials science
research since World War II, and a greater tendency
towards more collaborative and centralized projects, bio-
logical research was relatively isolated from these trends
until more recently. The Manhattan Project augmented
the evolution towards 'big science' for academic physics
researchers and led to increasing collaboration and con-
tacts with industrial research (as many government spon-
sored contracts were awarded to industry as well);
however, it was not until the Human Genome Project and
the Bayh-Dole Act of the 1980s and 1990s that similar
trends were seen in the biological sciences. Academic nan-
otechnology research has also followed a similar path,
with large collaborative projects (both among universities
and in partnership with industry) accelerated after the
injection of hundreds of millions of federal research dol-
lars. Nanotechnology, with its emphasis on device devel-
opment, held much commercial potential and thus
became viewed as a perfect opportunity for government
sponsorship.
In the United States, a dedicated group of scientific offi-
cials among various federal agencies led the charge to
develop a coherent, unified nanotechnology initiative.
America's response to the growing global challenge was
this program, which later became the National Nanotech-
nology Initiative (NNI). Once the NNI commenced, it
gained a momentum of its own, and subsequent develop-
ments, including the 21st century Nanotechnology
Research and Development Act (NRDA), were much eas-
ier to justify especially with the notion that American sci-
entific superiority was at stake, indelibly entrenching
nanotech as 'big science.'
Initially an afterthought, biological applications of nan-
otechnology (nanobiotechnology) soon became focus of
the federally sponsored research programs. Iijima's suc-
cessful fabrication of carbon nanotubes in 1991 demon-
strated the feasibility of bottom-up nanosynthesis, which
involved the creation of larger structures by directed self-
assembly from individual components. Shortly thereafter,
scientists began to explore the viability of experimentally
interfacing biology with nanotechnology, including the
assembly of DNA sequences into three-dimension struc-
tures and the attempt to create biological transistors [1,2].
These projects highlighted the potential for creating novel
devices, though fully functional applications would
require significantly more research.
The NNI and the NRDA afterwards prominently featured
biological applications as areas of high priority. With the
rise of the NIH as the pre-eminent federal funding agency
(with almost eight times as much money as the next near-
est agency), there were billions of dollars potentially avail-
able for nano research specifically directed towards the life
sciences. One of the first NIH-related agencies to devise
such a nano-biological framework was the NCI. Cancer
has been a specially designated research topic for over
thirty years, beginning with President Richard Nixon's
War on Cancer in the early 1970s. The NCI's Cancer Nan-
otechnology Plan (CNPlan) represented a direct link to
this focus on cancer and the desire to focus the tools of
nanotechnology towards problems of cancer detection
and treatment. Given the trends mentioned, this combi-
nation was perhaps inevitable, but will such research ulti-
mately be useful to biologists and clinicians? Despite the
rosy predictions of certain researchers, it is too soon to
predict the outcome.
This article focuses on the rise of nanotechnology and
nanobiotechnology under the patronage of various spon-
sors (both government and private foundations). We
place special emphasis on the confluence of nanoscience
with biological research and how the influence of such
sponsorship affected this research. We further detail the
similarity of many of the current nano initiatives to past
large-scale government sponsored projects, specifically
the Human Genome Project. Finally, the trends influenc-
ing the CNPlan are explored. While the ultimate impact of
nanotechnology on diverse fields is still yet to be deter-
mined, the progression of developments has already had
significant impact on the topics of research as well as on
federal research disbursements and helped to promote
these fields as big science.Page 2 of 16
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Nano Meets Bio
To understand the confluence between biology and nano-
science, it is necessary to return to the seminal events of
molecular biology in the 1950s. James Watson and Fran-
cis Crick's discovery of the structure of the DNA molecule
in 1953 opened a powerful new avenue of research. Sub-
sequent research enabled the elucidation of the genetic
code and the mechanisms of transcription and transla-
tion, the processes by which information encoded in DNA
is translated into RNA and ultimately into proteins (the
so-called 'Central Dogma' of biology) [3]. Research over
the next half century helped to build our knowledge of the
fundamental processes of enzymes and cells and the
molecular basis for many of the reactions of living organ-
isms.
Though most biological research deals with processes and
events that occur on the nanoscale, this research was not
considered part of nanotechnology, as such molecules
could not be directly manipulated. The linkage between
the two was tenuously formed, building in incremental
steps and with many experiments in between. By the early
1970s, biologists had learned much about how biomole-
cules functioned within the cellular environment; they
soon realized that they could engineer DNA and protein
sequences at will using many of the enzymes that the cell
normally used for life processes. Recombinant DNA tech-
nologies were enabled with the isolation of restriction
enzymes (the first by Dan Nathans) to cut DNA pieces and
ligases to attach the DNA fragments back together. The
discovery of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and the
development of high throughput DNA synthesis and
sequencing technologies were additional important mile-
stones [4]. Scientists could now amplify virtually any
DNA sequence and begin to undertake genome sequenc-
ing projects thanks to increasingly affordable DNA
sequencers. These technologies greatly expanded the
scope and scale of biological experimentation and inno-
vation.
By the 1990s, scientists began to design experiments to
specifically couple biology with nanofabricated devices
and tools [5-7]. Though the length scales were compati-
ble, there were significant challenges involved. Biological
systems are fundamentally wet and organic, whereas most
nanofabricated systems are hydrophobic and made of
inorganic materials (usually silicon-based). Though ideas
of nanobiotechnology had circulated among the scientific
community and general public for many years, actual
progress in this field only began when the initial seminal
advances of each contributory field (biotechnology and
nanotechnology) had come to fruition by the early 1990s.
These developments attracted many scientists interested
in the interface between the two. However, one major
problem was how to physically couple the two divergent
systems [8]. Some scientists circumvented this problem by
creating nanomachines made solely of natural molecules;
two notable examples were Nadrian Seeman's complex 3-
D structures created solely of DNA and Leonard Adle-
man's utilization of DNA to perform computation [9,10].
Others discovered or developed new coupling chemistries
in order to covalently bond organic and inorganic sub-
strates. The collaboration of scientists from both fields has
been important for refining tools used for nanobiotech-
nology and in building the path towards functional
hybrid devices. For example, Carlo Montemagno of UCLA
recently created hybrid nanomachines composed of an
inorganic nanopropeller with a biomolecular motor that
could use adenosine triphosphate (ATP) for energy [11].
Other device researchers have created more complex
hybrid functional micro-electro mechanical systems
(MEMS) and even nano-electro mechanical systems
(NEMS) devices composed of a combination of synthetic
and biological components [12].
Even with the increasing public awareness of nanotech-
nology, and with scientists initiating more projects, the
federal government's response in the late 1980s and early
1990s was rather sparse. Academic scientists hoping to
receive funding had to apply through existing programs
offered by the NSF or other granting agencies; there was
no specific focus on nanotechnology. However, the early
1990s marked a particularly fortuitous moment for nan-
otechnology, as the Cold War had ended and America was
concerned about its scientific superiority and was looking
for promising areas of research that could help maintain
its global scientific and economic edge. Thanks to this
attention, and the involvement of government officials
such as Mihail Roco at NSF, the time was ripe by the 1990s
for an organized government project. This effort culmi-
nated in the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI)
and its progeny and sent nanotechnology on the path
towards 'big science,' opening the door for large-scale
nanobiotechnology projects [13].
Big Science Requires Big Money
With great fanfare, President William J. Clinton
announced the National Nanotechnology Initiative
(NNI) to a packed audience at Caltech on January 21,
2000 [14]. Through this initiative, President Clinton more
than doubled the federal funding for nanotechnology
research to almost $500 million for fiscal year (FY) 2001;
since then, the budget has doubled once again to over $1
billion for FY 2006 [15]. Both commercial and state/
regional investments in nanotechnology similarly
increased significantly during this period. As Patrick
McCray has correctly argued, the NNI emerged at the
moment when politicians and policy makers were work-
ing to respond to growing international competition inPage 3 of 16
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last decade, worldwide governmental, academic, and cor-
porate support for nanotechnology research has increased
nearly exponentially, with new corporate and academic
projects and initiatives announced monthly. As a result of
this support, the transformation of nanotechnology into a
component of 'big science' is nearly complete.
This paradigm shift towards big science occurred in part
due to the increasingly specialized and expensive tools
required for cutting-edge nanoscale research. However,
much of this change came as research funding focused on
the establishment of federally supported nanotechnology
centers (designated by the NNI) at various universities
and research laboratories [Note C]. For the fortunate loca-
tions, being a 'chosen site' signified access to millions of
dollars of research funding. Other researchers would have
to compete for the remaining dollars.
Before enactment of the NNI and related initiatives, fed-
eral support for nano research was sporadic at best; there
was no distinct mechanism for obtaining financial sup-
port [16]. As a result, research proceeded through the early
1990s at various academic centers with intermittent grant
support from federal agencies such as NSF or the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE) [17]. With no promise of continu-
ity, researchers were at the mercy of grant officers and
review committees to maintain research support. Excite-
ment at the prospects of nanotechnology drew more
researchers into these fields, thus creating increasing pres-
sure for a more specific and formalized federal program.
Efforts by Mihail Roco of the NSF and others culminated
in the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) [Note
D]. The NNI emphasized eleven areas, the so-called
'Grand Challenges,' collaborative projects intended for
interagency funding. The remainder of the money would
be used to establish a national infrastructure with 'centers
of excellence' where researchers could collaborate and
access advanced equipment. Final approval of the NNI
came in the fall of 2000, with an allocation of $465 mil-
lion.
This emphasis on nanoscale research continued even with
the change of presidential administrations in early 2001.
President Bush proposed a modest increase in the budget
for the NNI in the FY 2002 budget; Congress topped this
by approving an additional 15% increase to a total of
$600 million [18]. After the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, nanotechnology research was increasingly pro-
moted as a means for detecting chemical and biological
toxin precursors and for helping to increase national secu-
rity. Because trace detection had been one of the original
selling features of nanotechnology, this research received
even greater funding [16]. Any lingering doubts of the effi-
cacy of nano research had long since disappeared, and
Congress was very receptive to calls for additional fund-
ing.
One limitation of the NNI was that it was a short-term ini-
tiative and therefore subject to the yearly funding alloca-
tion process. The National Research Council's (NRC)
initial review of the NNI, entitled Small Wonders, Endless
Frontiers, provided an impetus for formally codifying the
nanotechnology push into law to ensure continuity of
funding, which Congress soon addressed. In early 2003,
Representative Sherwood Boehlert introduced the Nan-
otechnology Research and Development Act of 2003 to
the House of Representatives [19], and Senator Ron
Wyden introduced the 21st Century Nanotechnology
Research and Development Act (hereafter referred to as
the NRDA) to the Senate floor [Note E]. The House was
first to conduct hearings on the merits of this proposal,
with the Science Committee holding hearings twice, on
March 19 and April 9, 2003. By this time, nanotechnology
had firm bipartisan support and Congress was generally
pleased with the implementation of the NNI. Passage of
the bill came swiftly on May 7, and the bill proceeded to
the Senate for consideration [20].
The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation held hearings on May 1. At these hearings, E.
Clayton Teague, the recently appointed full-time director
of the National Nanotechnology Coordination Office
(NNCO), testified in support of the legislation. In his oral
and written testimony, he emphasized the potential of
nanotechnology, especially for commercial applications
and technology transfer, and urged support for continuing
such research, mentioning that "...this great promise must
be tempered with the realization that our nanotechnology
capabilities are now at an embryonic stage. It has taken us
twenty years to progress from the ability to see atoms,
then to manipulate them, and finally a few years ago to
build a simple three atom structure – twenty years [21]."
He highlighted the progress made through the NNI and
the efforts of the relevant federal agencies to promote
technology transfer and commercialization applications
while emphasizing the applied nature of their research
[22].
The National Institutes of Health also submitted written
testimony in support, stressing the potential of biomedi-
cal applications and mentioning that nanotechnology
"has the potential to radically change the study of basic
biological mechanisms as well as to significantly improve
... treatment of diseases and adverse medical conditions
[23]." They further stressed the interdisciplinary nature
this work and the need to support research among various
fields, including engineering, physical science, biology,
and medicine. The benefits were stated in no uncertainPage 4 of 16
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ease and improve the human condition, with the ultimate
goal of a world where "diseases are diagnosed and pre-
vented or treated at early stages [23]." Implicit was the
promise that this was possible if Congress would allocate
the necessary funds.
While passage of the NNI had required its backers to clear
large hurdles, there was little uncertainty surrounding the
fate of this bill, as the senators were in favor of increased
support for nanotechnology. Once the NNI received fund-
ing, there was less incentive to backtrack, especially given
the glowing testimony of the witnesses and the strong
support of the scientific and business communities. By
mid-September, the Senate committee had referred the
bill to the full Senate [Note F], and final passage came on
November 19 by unanimous consent. Less than three
weeks later, on December 3, 2003, the 21st century Nan-
otechnology Research and Development Act became law
[24].
The NRDA authorized the president to implement a
national nanotechnology program administered by the
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). Much
as the NNI before, this program was intended to empha-
size interdisciplinary work and to "accelerat[e] the deploy-
ment and application of nanotechnology research and
development in the private sector [24]." Congress specifi-
cally allocated funding for additional centralized nanote-
chnology research centers and directed the president to
establish a National Nanotechnology Coordination
Office to provide technical support for implementation of
the NRDA and to conduct public outreach efforts. The act
also required President Bush to designate a National Nan-
otechnology Advisory Panel (NNAP) to provide advice
about nanotechnology trends and the efficacy of imple-
mentation of the NRDA [24]. Overall, nanotechnology
funding levels reached $3.7 billion for the subsequent
four years, representing a significant increase from the
previous funding levels established under the NNI.
In a recent strategic update to the NNI, mandated by the
NRDA and issued in December 2004, the Nanoscale Sci-
ence, Engineering, and Technology Subcommittee of the
NSTC examined many of the initial issues of the NNI and
also looked to its potential for the next ten years [25].
Overall, this report was supportive of the progress of NNI
supported research and made confident predictions that
the future would yield even better results and assist the
United States in maintaining its premier economic and
research advantages, stating, "...the NNI will provide a
balanced and coordinated investment in the program
component areas and in a broad spectrum of applications.
This will ensure that the United States remains a global
leader in the responsible development of nanotechnology
and secures the resulting benefits to the economy, to
national security, and to the quality of life of all citizens
[25]."
This report identified four major goals of the NNI, which
included maintaining a strong R&D program, facilitating
technology transfer for economic benefit, developing
infrastructure to advance nanotechnology, and support-
ing responsible development of nanotechnology. As man-
dated by the NRDA, the original 'grand challenges' of the
NNI were replaced by seven 'program component areas
[25].' The report also emphasized the development of
research centers, including already existing centers and
future planned projects. Investment in infrastructure
remains the major component of government nanotech-
nology spending. In total, the NSF, DOD, and NASA have
established 24 research centers at both academic and gov-
ernment laboratories which provide advanced technolo-
gies and equipment for collaborative efforts [26]. These
centers represent the 'favored' sites for government fund-
ing and have received a disproportionate share of funds,
while other academic researchers have had to compete for
the remainder. Despite this centralization of nanotech-
nology research, there has been little dissent due to the
massive quantities of federal dollars invested since 2001
and additional monies offered by other concerns. Political
support for nanotechnology is now a fait accompli, and
thanks to this federal largesse, nanotechnology has firmly
been established as big science.
Regional and Private Nanotechnology Initiatives
Meanwhile, state and local governments had begun to
enact supplementary initiatives to promote nanotechnol-
ogy research and cement connections among industry,
academia, and government. State governments especially
saw nanotechnology as a means for boosting regional
economies and luring companies into bringing prestig-
ious and high-paying jobs to certain areas. In an attempt
to attract corporations, many regions offered tax or other
relocation incentives. A small number of states allocated
supplemental funds to state-supported universities,
directed specifically towards nanotechnology research.
However, the scope and size of these initiatives varied
widely, ranging from the California Nanosystems Insti-
tute (CNSI), designed to provide infrastructure funding at
UCLA and UCSB to the level of $100 million for four
years, to the South Carolina NanoCenter, funded with a
one-time grant of $1 million [27]. Many localities were
trying to join the nano-bandwagon in an attempt to emu-
late the success of past regional investments in biotech-
nology or information technology, especially those in
California (Silicon Valley) and Massachusetts (Route
128).Page 5 of 16
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research, the Department of Commerce and the NNCO
convened a workshop in late 2003 to gather leaders
involved in establishing state and regional nanotechnol-
ogy initiatives in order to enhance communication
among and across these different programs [27]. The
focus of this meeting was to leverage the combined efforts
of the federal government with state government efforts to
prevent inefficiency and promote synergy if possible. As
the program summary noted, not all of these initiatives
would succeed; however, the report aimed to elucidate the
characteristics of successful ventures. Each local initiative
was encouraged to find a niche area to focus on for devel-
oping distinctive competencies to leverage partnerships
with corporate efforts [27].
Perhaps the most successful example of such an initiative
is the California Nanosystems Institute (CNSI), launched
almost concomitantly with the federal NNI. The CNSI was
proposed as one of a handful of science research institutes
designated for the various campuses of the University of
California system. Then-governor Gray Davis formally
introduced these research centers in his 2000–2001
budget, which were enacted in California Assembly Bill
2883 of 2000. The impetus for the establishment of these
institutes, which came to be known as the California Insti-
tutes for Science and Innovation, was to "ensure that Cal-
ifornia maintains and expands its role at the leading edge
of technological innovation in the 21st century" and to
"give rise to world-class centers for strategic innovation
that combine excellence in cutting-edge research with col-
laboration and training for our next generation of scien-
tists and technological leaders [28]." They included the
California Institute for Quantitative Biological Research
(QB3), the CNSI at UCSB and UCLA, and the California
Institute for Telecommunications and Information Tech-
nology (Cal-IT2) [29] [Note G]. This act formally estab-
lished these centers throughout the University of
California system and allocated a total of $300 million
over 4 years, with each receiving $25 million per year
from the state. State funding was contingent on securing
external 2:1 matching private and federal grants [30].
When the CNSI was established, lawmakers estimated
that it would provide at least $350 million in nanotech-
nology funding over the four year period, second only to
the NNI in financial commitment [31]. In particular, state
funding of the CNSI provided for the physical establish-
ment of buildings dedicated to nanoscience research
groups and for housing relevant equipment in support of
these endeavors at UCLA and UCSB. The state expected
these universities to find sponsors to fund everyday oper-
ating expenses; this was not expected to be problematic,
given significant corporate interest in supporting applied
academic research. Indeed, shortly after Gray Davis'
announcement, UCLA had already lined up over thirty
partners for the CNSI [32]. The explicit goals of the CNSI
were to leverage California's investment with federal and
private funds in order to create a nanotechnology hub
where such research could flourish. The new CNSI build-
ings would serve as central locations for equipment and
researchers with the goal of fostering collaboration and
interdisciplinary thinking among the scientists.
Within the first five years of operations, the CNSI attracted
the external financial support mandated by the legislature
and began an ambitious expansion program to establish
additional laboratories at UCSB and UCLA. With this level
of support, the NSF designated it as a NanoScience and
Engineering Center (NSEC) and awarded an $18 million
grant to create a research and fabrication center for
nanomanufacturing, entitled the Center for Scalable and
Integrated Nanomanufacturing [33]. The 2005 annual
report from the UCLA branch of CNSI markedly empha-
sized collaborative efforts, both between academic institu-
tions and with corporate interests [34]. The report
constantly stressed the benefits of state investment in
CNSI, to remind the public that the allocation of tax dol-
lars to this project would continue to produce tangible
benefits. Fraser Stoddart, the CNSI director mentioned in
his introduction, "With the appropriate investment, it can
help create jobs, foster economic growth, and promote
technological advancements that will improve the quality
of life for the people in California and beyond [34]." In
this era of limited government revenues, every dollar
spent must be shown to generate economic benefit.
California's level of commitment and involvement soon
became a model for other states to follow, though none
could provide as much financial support. Massachusetts,
home to many distinguished academic institutions,
looked to this example when identifying opportunities to
leverage its academic and commercial strengths to pro-
mote nanotechnology. A report prepared for the state eco-
nomic department mentioned these strengths and the
history of technology transfer to startup and other com-
mercial enterprises [35]. Given the strengths of their uni-
versities, especially MIT and Harvard, the authors
expected that success would be forthcoming. They encour-
aged a more conducive environment for scientific endeav-
ors and technology transfer, with less state regulation.
However, funds for such research were not readily forth-
coming; instead, the report mentioned that federal dollars
should be leveraged for maximal benefit. Other states ech-
oed many of these issues as they looked to join the nan-
otechnology bandwagon to capture some of the potential
economic benefits that such research promised.
Meanwhile, individual private benefactors and founda-
tions entered the research field through directed grants orPage 6 of 16
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ties. One heavily publicized effort was spearheaded by
Fred Kavli; through the Kavli Foundation, he began to
establish scientific research institutes, specifically focused
on nanoscience, neuroscience, and astrophysics, at vari-
ous universities throughout the world [36]. Kavli, a Nor-
wegian entrepreneur and founder of Kavlico, a firm that
manufactured sensors for aircraft and automobiles, used
the proceeds from the sale of his company in 2000 to
establish the Kavli Foundation to support basic science
research at universities worldwide. His first gift was a
donation of $7.5 million to UCSB in 2001 to establish the
Kavli Institute for Theoretical Physics. In the following
three years, Kavli established nine more institutes [37].
Though the interest from each gift is rather small in com-
parison to the endowment of these universities or the
amount of government grants that each receives, the
money is unrestricted and allows great freedom in choos-
ing research directions. One benefit of gifts from small
foundations (assets < $100 million) is that they allow sci-
entists to respond rapidly to emerging research needs.
Kavli hoped to use his gifts as 'seed money' to help scien-
tists explore promising but unproven research areas,
projects that would typically have trouble receiving gov-
ernment funding. He noted, "I'm looking for highly lever-
aged situations where institutions are putting in a large
share [of their own funds] [38]." In the era of constrained
federal budgets, this flexibility would be increasingly
important for exploring novel areas of research.
Three of the Kavli institutes were focused on nanoscience
and nanotechnology research: those at Cornell, the Delft
Institute of Technology in the Netherlands, and at
Caltech. Caltech established the Kavli Nanoscience Insti-
tute (KNI) in 2004 with an initial $7.5 million gift from
the Kavli Foundation. Along with support from the Moore
Foundation, the outlines of a broad nanotechnology insti-
tute were created, with specific foci on nanobiotechnol-
ogy and nanophotonics [39]. Michael Roukes, Caltech
professor of physics, was named as director, and he men-
tioned that "the primary emphases of the KNI will be on
nanobiotechnology, which merges nanodevice engineer-
ing with the molecular and cellular machinery of living
systems, and nanophotonics, which employs new materi-
als technology and nanofabrication processes to develop
novel devices such as optically active waveguides and
microlasers. Central to both of these endeavors is large-
scale integration of nanosystems [40]." Caltech's KNI was
formally dedicated at the inaugural Kavli Nanoscience
symposium on October 24, 2005 [41].
In an attempt to increase public interest and conscious-
ness of Kavli's chosen fields, he established the Kavli
Prizes in Nanoscience, Neuroscience, and Astrophysics in
2005. To be awarded every two years by the Norwegian
Academy of Sciences, with a value of $1 million each,
these prizes are intended to be complementary to the
most prestigious awards in science (e.g. Nobel, Crafoord,
Gruber). Kavli's motivation was to "raise the public
awareness of science," since societal support would be
critical "in order for the politicians to support spending
the funds," as most research funding for these fields came
from national governments [42]. Just as the Nobel prizes
beforehand, such awards are likely to attract media atten-
tion and thus the public's awareness to significant
advances in these fields.
Centralization of Nano Research
One major consequence of the NNI and other nanotech-
nology initiatives has been the establishment of this disci-
pline as 'big science,' with centralization of significant
research dollars and resources at select institutions and
the appointment of certain laboratories to receive support
for large-scale, integrated nanotechnology projects. In the
state of California alone, there were two major grants to
establish nanoscience institutes at three leading universi-
ties (two state funded and one private). While researchers
at other institutions have pursued nanoscience research,
they have had to make do with limited government funds
from agencies such as NSF or NIH, without the infrastruc-
ture support that the nanoscience institutes can offer. Fur-
thermore, grant programs have begun to emphasize cross-
disciplinary projects that require input from physicists,
biologists, and other scientists, both intramurally and
between institutions. It is apparent that in this third
'mega-era' of science policy [Note H], research resources
are becoming even more centralized with the increasing
need for collaborative and multidisciplinary projects in
order to satisfy the mandate (both from politicians and
the public) for research that is directed towards specific
economic and societal needs.
Federal grant agencies have now dedicated a significant
portion of grants towards interdisciplinary work and away
from the traditional fields of chemistry, biology, and
physics. As described, the NNI has supported the estab-
lishment of nanotechnology centers and user facilities at
national research laboratories and universities across the
country, with the goal of establishing infrastructure due to
the high costs of equipment [43]. These resources are usu-
ally concentrated at the top-tier research universities
because these institutions have the most prolific research-
ers and large research budgets to fund additional work.
In many ways, the NNI is accelerating trends seen at aca-
demic research institutions in recent years. According to
Roger Geiger, the first formal links between academia and
industry came in the 1920s (notable examples being MIT
and Michigan's Engineering Department); however, the
significant majority of links were forged in the 1980s [44].Page 7 of 16
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argues that there has been a convergence (albeit asymmet-
ric) in research practice between industry and university,
concomitant with increasing emphasis on university-
industry relations. Such relations are now explicitly
encouraged by government and have become more for-
malized and extensive [45].
Similar trends are evident in the centralization of research
facilities and projects. The idea of centralized research lab-
oratories for physics and engineering was significantly
strengthened during World War II with the need to con-
centrate efforts on developing the nuclear bomb and
other projects of military interest. Such organized research
units were often under or later transferred to university
control. However, there was little pressure towards such
facilities in other disciplines until very recently. This trend
towards centralized research facilities and cooperative
projects (what John Ziman terms 'collectivization') is
driven partly by researchers' need for increasingly expen-
sive and intricate instruments [45]. Because modern
research is increasingly transdisciplinary and requires a
great deal of specialization, individuals working in isola-
tion cannot generally solve major scientific problems any
longer.
Another hallmark is the constraint on funding and the
limits to its growth. Historically, science could easily grow
exponentially as very few individuals were engaged in
research. However, with federal science budgets of devel-
oped nations at 2–3% of gross domestic product, there is
very little room for augmented funding. As a result,
increased allocations for nanotechnology mean less
money for other disciplines. Science is under significant
pressure to provide greater societal benefits for the money
allocated. Given societal and epistemic changes, scientists
have begun to internalize these trends and emphasize the
direct and indirect benefits of their work in response,
especially short-term utility and applicability. Funding
agencies are increasingly requiring that grant applicants
stress the practical benefits of their research, and most aca-
demic scientists have little choice but to comply. Such pol-
icy shifts have been a direct result of the increasingly
competitive environment of the past thirty years.
Government scientific priorities underwent a marked shift
in the late 1970s and early 1980s due to global economic
considerations. The old paradigm that funding pure basic
science was useful because such research would provide
the knowledge for new technologies was challenged. A
poignant criticism was that this work was ultimately irrel-
evant for the economy and that America did not have the
luxury of funding this while other nations were support-
ing applied and industrial research. Increasingly, corpo-
rate leaders and politicians adopted the view that the
government should encourage 'productive' research, work
that would lead to practical applications and boost the
economy [46]. One result was a shift in research priorities
at the end of the Cold War away from pure basic science
(such as particle or high-energy physics) towards more
applied or practical basic sciences (e.g., the biological sci-
ences, as such research was often relevant for pharmaceu-
tical or biotechnology products), as reflected in the
budgets of the relevant granting agencies. Throughout the
1990s, the budgets for NSF and NASA remained stagnant
while the budget for the NIH increased fivefold [Note I].
By the time Congress debated the NNI, there was no ques-
tion that the initiative would focus on applied technolo-
gies.
In the initial NNI proposal, the greatest stress was on
projects that could be completed within a 5 year time win-
dow, to emphasize its focus on applications that would
yield commercially relevant results in the shortest time
[43]. The President's Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (PCAST) report in support of the NNI had to
justify the need for funding longer term research by noting
industry's aversion to funding such endeavors, while still
maintaining that the research was viable and only needed
continuous government support [47]. Despite this appar-
ent support for longer term work, most of the initial
awards were for evolutionary research that had the best
prospects for near-term success. In response, the NAS
encouraged the NNI to support higher-risk, exploratory
research that had greater potential for significant break-
throughs [48]. However, mindful of the economic
emphasis of the NNI, the NAS also recommended pro-
moting research transfer to society and fostering industrial
partnerships to accelerate commercialization: "In devel-
oping nanoscale science and technology as a competence
of the national scientific and industrial establishment, the
federal government must promote, cooperate, seed, and
leverage [48]."
This transformation of government research priorities to
an applied science focus was well underway by the time
the NNI Strategic Plan Update was published in Decem-
ber 2004. The update explicitly stated the fiscal rationale
for nanotechnology funding, namely increased economic
development and prosperity: "Towards this vision, the
NNI will expedite the discovery, development, and
deployment of nanotechnology in order to achieve
responsible and sustainable economic benefits...Nanote-
chnology R&D has led to substantial increases in scientific
knowledge, publications, patents, and new jobs and busi-
nesses in this area. Much of this success is directly or indi-
rectly based on the results of Federally funded R&D [43]."
Universities were especially encouraged to collaborate
amongst themselves and with industry to realize the com-
mercial and societal potential of this research.Page 8 of 16
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Given its emphasis on applied research and the explicit
bias in support of projects of commercial interest, the NNI
has significantly promoted the continued blurring of any
distinction between academic and industrial research and
explicitly encouraged stronger links between the two. This
trend has been evident for many years in engineering dis-
ciplines, as university-industry relations have been
strengthening for many years in these areas (as Roger Gei-
ger has noted), a result of the 'practical' nature of most
engineering research, whereas basic science had been
more insulated [44,49]. As Daniel Kleinman mentioned,
academic science has begun to resemble industrial science
with its focus on specific topics with defined goals (often
for business applications) [50,51]. If scientific research is
primarily intended for national economic benefit, then
this trend is unavoidable. Many of the federal govern-
ment's policies of the past twenty-five years have explicitly
promoted this development by increasing the economic
incentive to pursue research with distinct commercial and
patent possibilities, as Ann Johnson has detailed [52].
With federal research budgets static or shrinking as a per-
centage of GDP, universities began to seek outside sources
of funding [53]. There were a few private foundations that
would disburse grants; however, these funds were usually
intended for specific, targeted purposes. As a result, uni-
versities increasingly turned to industry for a steady source
of money. In return for receiving unrestricted dollars
which they could allocate as needed, universities and aca-
demic departments often agreed to exclusively license any
resulting patents to the sponsoring companies. A well-
publicized example was the agreement between the
Department of Plant and Microbial Biology at University
of California, Berkeley and Novartis to negotiate licenses
for about 30% of all patents from the department on a
first refusal basis in return for $25 million in support over
five years beginning in 1998 [54-56]. Participating
researchers agreed to submit their manuscripts to Novartis
in advance of publication and to sign confidentiality
agreements if they utilized the company's databases. Fur-
thermore, Novartis received seats on the department's
research advisory committees [57]. Although some aca-
demics protested against such commercialization because
of the different cultures of academic versus industrial
research, most acquiesced in this shift. Collaborations
between academic labs and industry, once largely found
among the engineering and applied sciences, were becom-
ing increasingly common among all science departments
as a means of garnering research funds.
The government already had mechanisms for directly sup-
porting small business' research through Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technol-
ogy Transfer (STTR) grants administered by the Small
Business Administration (SBA); STTR grants specifically
required businesses to collaborate with non-profit labora-
tory partners to qualify for funds [58]. To encourage this,
Congress required that federal agencies receiving research
funding of more than $100 million per year set aside
2.5% of these funds for small companies to conduct inno-
vative research. Each program encompassed two phases of
funding; phase I funding was to establish feasibility and
businesses could receive up to $100,000 for one year.
Phase II funding provided limited support for further
research and development and for exploration of com-
mercial opportunities; grants could range up to $750,000
over two years. Afterwards, the SBA expected the company
to raise private funds to fully migrate the product into the
competitive marketplace.
The negative aspects of the increasing commercialization
of academic research include loss of control and the con-
comitant trend towards selective revelation of results.
Industrial research is often based on the premise of trade
secrets or proprietary information and companies are
increasingly requiring academics who accept funding to
keep research results private or at least delay publication
until patents can be secured. Similarly, the previous open-
ness of academic science is increasingly curtailed by the
commercialization of research as academics more fre-
quently seek patent protection for their own discoveries.
In the extreme case, corporate interests can demand that
academics seek prior permission before publishing,
allowing for review of the data to potentially suppress
findings that might negatively affect the company. While
many universities seek clauses allowing unfettered publi-
cation, this is not always true. The case of Betty Dong, a
pharmacy professor at University of California, San Fran-
cisco, illustrated the potential pitfalls of such corporate
support. Dong had received a $250,000 grant from the
Boots drug company to carry out a comparative study of
Synthroid, a drug used to treat hypothyroidism, and three
similar generic drugs [Note J]. The Boots Company
wanted to demonstrate that the brand name drug was
superior to the generic drugs. Dong found that the generic
drugs were equally effective as Synthroid, and that the
generics were significantly cheaper and would save con-
sumers millions of dollars a year. Boots was displeased
and managed to block publication of this data since Dong
had signed a contract with the company that allowed
them to control publication and UCSF was unwilling to
defend her [59]. However, the resulting uproar and con-
troversy within the scientific community forced Boots to
relent and allow publication [Note K]. In many cases, the
combination can be synergistic; in others, there can be
mutual antagonism as the two cultures clash.
Increasingly, professors were founding startup companies
based on research from their laboratories, often funded byPage 9 of 16
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of 1980, which allowed universities to directly patent fed-
erally sponsored research without having to pay royalties
or specifically negotiate licenses with the government
[60], their discoveries were more easily patented and
licensed, with royalties going to the inventors and their
institutions. Universities, interested in the bottom line,
were happy to acquiesce for a share of the profits [Note L].
By the late 1990s, there were few universities that did not
aggressively pursue such opportunities and market their
research to commercial interests. With stagnant federal
research budgets and increasing bureaucracies, funds had
to come from somewhere, and industry seemed an appro-
priate partner.
Nanotechnology as 'Big Science': A Comparison to the 
Human Genome Project
The establishment of nanotechnology and nanobiotech-
nology as 'big science' followed centralizing trends in
most scientific disciplines over the past sixty years as
described. This development was perhaps less noticed
given the establishment of large-scale, integrated projects
and facilities in all major disciplines, including biology.
Indeed, by the time the NNI was approved, the existence
of large-scale, big science laboratories and projects was
taken for granted in physics, engineering, and biology.
The first major impetus came from the Manhattan Project,
which established centralized laboratories for physics and
certain engineering research, as described by Jeff Hughes
[61]. However, biology did not experience such pressures
until the establishment of the Human Genome Project
(HGP), which have not been as extensively detailed. The
progression of the HGP portended many of the policies
and trends seen in the NNI, but with certain features
unique to each. We identify certain forces and lessons
from the HGP and discuss how they have affected the NNI
and may impact further implementation.
In many significant aspects, the NNI is similar to the HGP.
Both programs were initiated partly on the basis of bold
claims made by scientists and other visionaries to advance
their interests. However, unlike for nanotechnology, there
were initially few companies performing genome
sequencing research because of the prohibitive costs and
the lack of immediate tangible benefits. The difficulties of
organizing such a large scale project nonetheless
remained. Robert Sinsheimer, a molecular biologist and
chancellor of UC Santa Cruz, and Charles DeLisi, director
of the Office of Health and Environment at the DOE
spearheaded initial work on the HGP, just as Roco at the
NSF provided a major impetus for the NNI [62].
Both initiatives were intended to be multidisciplinary
efforts spanning different governmental institutes, and
each was subjected to turf battles and infighting that lim-
ited the scope that could be accomplished and even
threatened to derail portions at times. Beginning in 1985,
DeLisi lobbied for money for the HGP and finally received
$5.5 million for the DOE's genome effort in 1987 [62].
However, the DOE's push to begin genome sequencing
bothered certain scientists at the NIH, as they worried that
they would lose grant money as a result [63], while other
scientists were worried of the loss of autonomy due to this
large initiative. When Congress approved the final appro-
priations bill, both the NIH and the DOE received fund-
ing for genome research, with the NIH receiving 50
percent more than the DOE. The federal government had
officially become inextricably involved in a large science
project which eventually impacted all of molecular biol-
ogy. In 1988, James Watson became head of the National
Center for Human Genome Research, a newly created
position within the NIH to manage this growing project
[62]. The era of 'Big Biology' had arrived.
The tendency towards centralized biological research
became especially prominent in the late 1980s with the
establishment of NIH-funded genome centers. Though
the NIH was the major government biomedical research
laboratory, its budgets had trailed those of NSF or DOE.
With the establishment of the HGP and related biomedi-
cal initiatives, the NIH received significant allocations
from Congress to fund these centers at academic laborato-
ries to serve as resources for the entire academic biology
community. Thanks to this increased and continued sup-
port, the NIH has now become the largest federal granting
agency, with a FY 2005 budget of over $20 billion.
Once the NNI had been proposed, it also faced similar
critics who were worried that the creeping force of govern-
ment support would turn nanotechnology into big sci-
ence, just as genomics had converted certain aspects of
biological research into big biology. It was difficult to see
how the individual researcher could possibly innovate in
such an environment. Indeed, implementation of the NNI
and related nanotechnology funding by government has
led to further expansion of big science through the estab-
lishment of user facilities and 'nanoscience institutes' at
various universities and laboratories throughout the
country. As a result of equipment requirements, funding
has been concentrated at specific locations (the genome
centers for the HGP, and the nanoscience centers for NNI)
which obtained the bulk of federal spending for the
respective projects.
The NNI received less criticism from scientists than the
genome project, in part because many had become accus-
tomed to big science through developments either in
physics or biology. They realized that research budgets
were unlikely to increase as in the past; it was therefore
best to encourage funding increases for their areas ofPage 10 of 16
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interest. Even so, the NNI received exponentially more
money in its first full year of funding compared to the
HGP. One potential reason for this disparity is that the
short-term prospects of nanotechnology appeared more
lucrative than for the genome project, thanks to greater
initial corporate interest in the NNI. Nonetheless, by its
final years, the NIH provided more than $2 billion to the
HGP and supported research at many genome centers
throughout the country. Given the current rate of growth
for nanotechnology research, it appears that the NNI will
exceed this figure within the next five years.
One major difference between the two relates to the role
of industry. The initial genome supporters urged funding
because they argued that companies were unlikely to
devote significant resources to sequencing genomes due
to the immense cost and time (in the mid-1980s, sequenc-
ing was tedious and expensive and it was unknown how
long sequencing even a fraction of the human genome
would take). Furthermore, no one clearly understood the
full significance of having these DNA sequences. On the
other hand, the NNI has involved industry from the
beginning and explicitly aimed to encourage research with
business applications. With the NNI, small companies are
specifically encouraged to apply for SBIR and STTR grants
from the NIH and other federal grant agencies; such grants
were unavailable or virtually unknown at the commence-
ment of the HGP.
The trajectory of the HGP portended many of the develop-
ments and features of the NNI. Though the HGP was ini-
tially opposed by certain scientists worried about the
consequences of big science, it ultimately gained wide-
spread acceptance. In fact, the HGP began to develop its
own inertia, gaining exponentially greater resources as the
project continued and expanding into related research
areas. A similar route can be seen for the NNI, with its ini-
tial growth occurring even faster. The relative abundance
of resources for nanotechnology has attracted more
research and provided an impetus for its expansion into
other disciplines, especially for biological and medical
applications, as these are seen as areas where nanotech-
nology might provide novel insights and potentially eco-
nomically valuable returns.
The Nano-War Against Cancer
One significant example of the expansion of nanobiotech-
nology initiatives has been towards applications for can-
cer research and treatments. A main selling point of the
NNI was the potential of nanotechnology towards issues
of human health and disease. Part of the interest in the
linkage between nanobiotechnology and cancer is due to
self-interest – research is more likely to be funded if tar-
geted towards specific problems, especially health care.
But certain researchers also believe that nanotechnology is
a perfect fit because molecular biology deals with nano-
sized molecules and processes [12]. A significant portion
of this research has focused on the problem of identifying
small quantities of molecules in solution, with the aim of
detecting the presence of abnormal biological markers
within serum to facilitate disease diagnosis and treatment
[64].
Though nanotechnology has had limited impact on med-
ical care and treatment to date, there is a sentiment among
nanotechnology researchers that it will significantly
impact the delivery and practice of medicine, though
other scientists and physicians either are less convinced or
are waiting to see the results [65,66]. Much of the initial
optimism among nano-researchers comes from recent dis-
coveries and inventions that interface nanotechnology
with biological systems [12]. Cancer has been an espe-
cially important target because of the scope of the disease;
in America alone, nearly 1.5 million individuals are diag-
nosed with cancer each year [67]. According to its promot-
ers, the true promise of nanotechnology lies in its
potential towards specific and individualized medicine
based on improved detection and treatment modalities
[68].
Certain doctors and cancer researchers see these treat-
ments as the logical progression of cancer therapy [69].
According to Andrew von Eschenbach, former director of
the NCI, "the future of oncology – and the opportunity to
eliminate the suffering and death due to cancer – will
hinge on our ability to confront cancer at its molecular
level [67]." They see nanotechnology as a key component
to facilitating this transition. Because of its scope, there is
greater optimism that its tools can be brought to bear
upon many of the issues facing oncology. However, others
are more circumspect about the possibilities, acknowledg-
ing the potential for enhancing research and willing to uti-
lize any useful discoveries, but cognizant of the potential
difficulties of biological and cancer systems [66].
Although the claims from supporters has been reminis-
cent of initial talk about nanotechnology (especially from
Eric Drexler), initial, short-term research work has been
incremental and evolutionary in nature and has largely
focused on developing novel and ultrasensitive diagnostic
tools for the detection of cancer cells and markers secreted
by these cells at very low quantities [70]. The goal is to
identify cancerous or pre-cancerous cells before the tumor
has a chance to grow and metastasize, as it is much easier
to target the cancer with specific drugs at an early stage
[12]. Other groups have worked on detecting tumors
within animals, for identification for biopsy purposes and
surgical removal, including the use of nanoparticles to
specifically target cancerous areas [71]. Longer-term goalsPage 11 of 16
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liest stage, with devices for testing serum for thousands of
cancer markers and precise targeting of cancer cells with
specific therapeutics to reduce side effects.
The Cancer Nanotechnology Plan
Given the interest in applying nanotechnology towards
the goal of individualized cancer therapies, the National
Cancer Institute (NCI) launched an ambitious initiative in
2004, entitled the Cancer Nanotechnology Plan (CNP-
lan). Its purpose was to meet the grand challenge goal of
eliminating suffering from cancer by 2015, with $144 mil-
lion in funding allocated for the first five years [72]. While
this was a tall order and almost certainly not achievable in
the specified timeframe, given the complexities of cancer
cells and the paucity of treatments available, this program
encapsulated many of the hopes and expectations of nan-
otechnology. Andrew von Eschenbach, director of the
NCI, mentioned that nanotechnology would have "a pro-
found, disruptive effect on how we diagnose, treat, and
prevent cancer [72]." To this end, the NCI began to fund
multidisciplinary efforts towards improved detection and
treatment. The projects initiated under the CNPlan were
to be milestone-driven and product oriented, with specific
and clear objectives enumerated, to be integrated with
developments under the NNI.
In the CNPlan vision statement, the NCI's major stated
aim was to "catalyze targeted discovery and development
efforts that offer the greatest opportunity for advances in
the near and medium terms and to lower the barriers for
those advances to be handed off to the private sector for
commercial development [72]." The focus of the entire
project was business-oriented, with an emphasis on tangi-
ble milestones and with the explicit purpose to transfer
technologies to industry, in concordance with the post-
academic scientific mode. These objectives included the
development of imaging agents and diagnostics to detect
early stages of cancer and devices for treating localized
cancers.
The NCI plan aimed to foster partnerships among
academia, industry, and government through the estab-
lishment of Centers of Cancer Nanotechnology Excellence
(CCNEs) [73]. The purpose of these centers was ostensibly
to integrate nanotechnology development into both basic
and applied research directed towards clinical cancer
treatments with specific milestones. To ensure breadth of
research, the NCI required CCNEs to be integrated with a
comprehensive cancer center and one or more specialized
programs of research excellence (SPORE) and to be affili-
ated with engineering and physical science research cent-
ers [74]. Finally, the NCI expected these centers to foster
industry partnerships to facilitate technology transfer
from the laboratory to the marketplace. The first set of
centers, funded in late 2005, focused mainly on issues of
nanoparticle delivery, targeting against specific cancers,
and sensitive detection of cancer markers and cells.
The NCI effort represents one of the more ambitious nan-
otechnology projects funded by the federal government.
Although other nations have initiatives for nanobiotech-
nology, only the United States has specifically designated
funding for research into applications towards cancer
treatments. As infectious diseases have been largely con-
trolled over the last fifty years, cancer has arisen as one of
the major health concerns of the developed world. Con-
comitantly, due to the complexities of cancer and the rel-
ative lack of directed therapeutics, much scientific
attention has been focused on understanding the basics.
Beginning with the 'War on Cancer' in the early 1970s, the
federal government has spent billions of dollars to inves-
tigate the pathways of cancer [Note M]. In recent years,
there has been a push towards understanding cancer with
a systems approach. New instruments such as DNA and
protein microarrays have allowed for a global analysis of
cancerous cells and a more complete picture of the
changes that occur. Likewise, the development of novel
therapeutics, including the introduction of monoclonal
antibodies against specific tumor markers and factors
(such as VEGF or TNF-a) has facilitated specific targeting
while reducing systemic toxicity and side effects. These tar-
geted therapeutics were a direct result of an improved
molecular understanding of cancer processes.
Because of societal pressures to 'cure cancer,' ample funds
are available to address these issues. One result is the
expectation that the full weight of science be brought
against the complex problems of cancer biology in order
to fully treat this vast category of diseases. Even the NCI
report succumbed to this pressure and announced its
overarching goal as the entire eradication of cancer within
ten years. Given the complexities of the disease, and the
many forms it can take, this is an unrealistic goal a priori,
especially within such a constrained timeframe. However,
there certainly will be further seminal breakthroughs dur-
ing this period, and nanotechnology may enable some of
these advances.
Despite these advances, will such research investment in
the 'nano-war against cancer' ultimately be useful? History
is replete with examples of research promoted to solve cer-
tain problems, only to find a more complex reality
(nuclear energy is one notable example) [Note N]. Many
cancer researchers are unaware of nanotechnology's tools,
while others are hopeful that these tools will help address
certain specific research questions, but are unsure of the
more expansive claims of nanobiotechnology's support-
ers [65,66,69]. Even if useful tools are developed, it willPage 12 of 16
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for use with patients.
The history of the human genome project may provide
some guidance to this concern. With the entire genome
now available, it is clear that the sequence information
itself means little without other studies to interpret what
base pair differences signify in terms of health and disease.
Furthermore, most diseases have multi-factorial genetic
and environmental causes. The panacea that the initial
genome project supporters promised with a complete
sequence has not yet been realized; however, this infor-
mation has proven quite useful to scientific inquiry and
has spawned new fields of research, including bioinfor-
matics and computational biology. Though initial results
are encouraging, it is impossible to fully predict the
impact that nanobiotechnology will have on cancer and
in other fields; however, given the trajectory of the HGP,
it is clear that the expansion of nanotechnology is far from
complete.
Conclusion
The rise and relative prominence of nanobiotechnology
has resulted from a combination of seminal advances in
both nanoscience and biotechnology. While the roots of
nanotechnology stretch back many years, the explosion of
research activity has only occurred within the last fifteen
years. Institutionally, the involvement of the federal gov-
ernment through the establishment and subsequent fund-
ing of the National Nanotechnology Initiative helped to
further the transformation of such research into 'big sci-
ence.' This model has led to the centralization of equip-
ment and funding resources into large national labs and
research centers. As budgetary pressures continue to
squeeze science, we will see further consolidation of
research. Small groups will continue to exist but will
increasingly be crowded by the larger facilities.
We have explored the political and scientific shifts that
have enabled the rise of nanotechnology and nanobio-
technology as big science. These financial and epistemic
trends have accelerated this transition with a concomitant
shift away from the individual researcher towards group-
oriented and large-scale science with an increase in con-
tacts between academia and industry. Additionally, fed-
eral policy has increasingly emphasized research with
economic potential and encouraged technology transfer
between universities and commercial firms, providing fur-
ther incentive for research projects with potential com-
mercial applications. As federal funding becomes
increasingly subject to budgetary pressures, industrial sup-
port is beginning to represent a more significant fraction
of academic funding. The full effect of such a shift remains
to be seen, but already we are witnessing a greater empha-
sis on academic research with practical benefits and com-
mercial potential.
One area in which nanotechnology research has been
applied is in the design of technologies for detection and
treatment of cancer. Scientists have already begun to cre-
ate novel nanodevices to detect and treat cancers, though
the ultimate impact remains to be seen due to limited
exposure in the broader scientific and medical communi-
ties. Given the molecular complexities of various cancer
types and the amount still unknown, it is rather unlikely
that we can completely eliminate cancer in the ten year
time frame given by the NCI. Nanotechnology has the
potential to impact biological research by allowing scien-
tists an ever-expanding tool set with which to explore the
questions of nature, but this outcome is by no means
guaranteed.
The scope of nanobiotechnology is continually expanding
as scientists develop more applications, especially in the
area of nanomedicine and towards the idea of personal-
ized medicine. However, despite the extensive and some-
times fanciful predictions of its boosters, the impact of
nanobiotechnology is still extremely limited; we may
have to wait many decades some of these promised
results, if they even materialize. The example of semicon-
ductor technologies provides an instructive lesson in the
time lag between laboratory breakthroughs and wide-
spread use [48]. The first transistor was developed in
1947; however, it took many decades for the transistor
and later integrated circuit to be utilized on a massively
parallel scale to create computer microchips. It was not
until the early 1990s with the explosion of information
technology that the greater potential of the transistor tech-
nology was realized. Most corporations, university
researchers, and government agencies do not have a forty
year outlook, yet this is the likely time scale for current
nanotechnology development to be fully realized as prod-
ucts if at all. Such implementations will almost undoubt-
edly be different from how we imagine them now but will
be enabled by the discoveries of today.
Notes
A. In subsequent documents from the NCI, this plan is
referred to as the Cancer Nanotechnology Plan (CNPlan).
We will refer to this program as the CNPlan henceforth.
B. The terms 'nanoscience' and 'nanotechnology' are often
used interchangeably. 'Nanoscience' by itself refers solely
to phenomena that occur on the 1–100 nm length scales,
which happens to encompass virtually all disciplines of
biology as well as many aspects of chemistry and physics.
Perhaps the closest 'official' definition of 'nanotechnol-
ogy' comes from the NNI itself; this version maintains that
nanotechnology has three aspects: research and technol-Page 13 of 16
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and 100 nanometers, creation of devices that have new
properties and/or uses due to their small size, and the
ability to control such objects on the atomic level. Even
this definition is quite expansive in scope, as the length
scale encompasses phenomena ranging from single
molecular events (at ~1 nm) to bulk materials incorporat-
ing thousands of atoms (at ~100 nm), with everything in
between also included. In this essay, the terms 'nano-
science' and 'nanotechnology' are used interchangeably.
C. For more detailed information, see the latest updates to
the NNI – President's Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology: The National Nanotechnology Initiative at Five
Years: Assessment and Recommendations of the National Nan-
otechnology Advisory Panel. Washington, D.C.: President's
Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2005 and
National Science and Technology Council,: The National
Nanotechnology Initiative: Strategic Plan. Washington, D.C.:
National Science and Technology Council, 2000.
D. For a detailed description of the processes involved in
drafting and passage of the NNI, see McCray.
E. The original texts of these bills are available online at
the Library of Congress http://thomas.loc.gov.
F. The subcommittee's report provides more detail as to
the costs and issues relating to the law. See Report of the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
"21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Develop-
ment Act," S. 189, (Washington D.C.: Government Print-
ing Office, September 15, 2003).
G. The Center for Information Technology Research in the
Interest of Society (CITRIS) was established later as a Cal-
ISI.
H. In 1998, the House Committee on Science released a
report regarding long-term federal science and technology
policy. This report, entitled "Unlocking Our Future,"
emphasized the priority for federally funded basic
research in many areas and the need for improved science
education in order to fully leverage America's scientific
advantages. In this report, the authors also mentioned
that we have now entered the third 'mega-era' of science
policy (the first being agricultural research funding before
World War II, and the second being science policy during
the Cold War), with emphasis on global communication
and competitiveness.
I. For an interesting discussion about science policy and
its effect on research and development, see Sarewitz D:
Does Science Policy Exist, and if so, Does It Matter?
Some Observations on the U.S. R&D Budget. Discussion
Paper for the Earth Institute Science, Technology, and Global
Development Seminar, April 8, 2003.
J. For more information about this case and others involv-
ing scientific freedom and corporate interests, see Krimsky
S: Science in the Private Interest: Has the Lure of Profits Cor-
rupted Biomedical Research? Lanham, MD: Rowman & Lit-
tlefield, 2003. This book is reviewed in Murray TH: Saving
the Soul of Science? Nature Biotechnology 2003, 21:1135–
1136.
K. As a result of this episode, the Boots Company ulti-
mately paid over $40 million in damages to states that
filed suit to recovery extra money paid for Synthroid when
generics would have been as effective. See Wadman M:
$100 m Payout After Drug Data Withheld. Nature 1997,
388: 703.
L. For more information about how passage of the Bayh-
Dole act affected university practices regarding patents,
see Rai AK, Eisenberg RS: Bayh-Dole Reform and the
Progress of Biomedicine. Law and Contemporary Problems
2003, 289.
M. In 1971, President Nixon declared a war on cancer
with passage of the National Cancer Act. This act provided
the NCI the authority to carry on a national cancer pro-
gram and allowed the NCI budget to be approved directly
by the president. It also significantly increased funding for
cancer-related research.
N. For a good history and background of nuclear energy
and its failure to take significant hold in the United States,
see Cohn S: Too Cheap to Meter: An Economic and Philosoph-
ical Analysis of the Nuclear Dream. Albany, NY: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 1997.
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